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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001945

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [PTER](#) [UNSC](#) [SU](#) [KPKO](#)  
SUBJECT: SE NATSIOS' MEETING WITH DPKO U/SYG GUEHENNO

REF: USUN NEW YORK 01911

Classified By: Ambassador John R. Bolton for reasons 1.4 (b,d).

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: During an October 5 meeting with UN DPKO U/SYG Jean Marie Guehenno, Special Presidential Envoy for the Sudan Andrew Natsios pushed DPKO to move quickly on implementing the UN support package for AMIS. Guehenno voiced cautious optimism regarding recent developments related to Darfur, citing Sudanese President Bashir's acceptance of the UN assistance package. Guehenno urged haste on diplomatic efforts to obtain Bashir's acceptance of a UN peacekeeping force for Darfur, noting that the UN would need the consent of the GOS by the end of October or early November to deploy before AMIS, mandate expires on December ¶31. Guehenno said the a UN peacekeeping force in Darfur will require "quality troops" and welcomed the USG emphasis outlined by Natsios on underlying development issues and regional inequities. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (U) UN Participants: DPKO U/SYG Jean Marie Guehenno, DPKO Deputy Hedi Annabi, UN Notetaker. USG Participants: Special Envoy Andrew Natsios, Chief of Staff Andrew Steinfeld, USUN MSC LTC Patrick Murray, USUN Poloff (notetaker).

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Guehenno: Moment May Be Auspicious  
For New Political Effort  
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¶3. (C) Guehenno voiced cautious optimism regarding recent developments related to Darfur. The recent battle for al-Fashir demonstrated to the Government of Sudan (GOS) that they will not be able to meet their objective of destroying non-signatory rebel groups before the UN peacekeeping force moves into Sudan. Likewise, Bashir's positive written response to UN SYG Annan and pledge of "personal support" for the UN assistance package for AMIS is a "highly significant development." Guehenno acknowledged that Bashir could still attempt to delay the assistance package by holding equipment up at Port Sudan, or seek to delay deployment of the 200 UN logistics and command and control experts by refusing to grant them visas. So far, however, the UN had seen no indications that Bashir plans to set up "unnecessary roadblocks."

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October, Early November  
Is &Go-Date8 for UN  
Peacekeeping Force  
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14. (C) Guehenno urged haste on diplomatic efforts to obtain Bashir's acceptance of a UN peacekeeping force for Darfur, noting that the UN would need the consent of the GOS by the end of October or early November in order to deploy before AMIS, mandate expires on December 31. Guehenno said UN DPKO will need more time to deploy to Sudan because it is "the most landlocked place in Africa" and lacks roads and basic infrastructure. Guehenno expressed pessimism that more countries would agree to commit troops to UNMIS in the absence of "political clarity on the peacekeeping mission." So far, only three nations have pledged troops for a UN peacekeeping force in Darfur -) Norway, Tanzania, and Bangladesh. In addition to the increased security risk to UN troops if Bashir refuses to comply with UNSCR 1706, Guehenno said logistics for the peacekeeping mission would be significantly more complicated if the UN force could not use Port Sudan. For these reasons, Guehenno commented, "The peacekeeping force is no substitute for progress on the diplomatic front."

15. (C) Natsios responded by acknowledging the need for progress on diplomacy with the Sudan. In the meantime, Natsios urged DPKO to move forward on the assistance package for AMIS as soon as possible. He noted that the US has placed significant diplomatic pressure on the GOS already, and will continue working to obtain Sudanese consent for a UN peacekeeping deployment. Foreshadowing a point made in a subsequent meeting with SYG Annan (reftel), Guehenno pointed to the Egyptians and the Arab League as especially useful interlocutors with the Sudanese.

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UN Assistance is  
Critical First Step  
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16. (C) Guehenno described the UN assistance package for AMIS agreed by Bashir as a "modest contribution and a critical first step." The 200 UN experts include logisticians, command and control experts, political and police advisers, and a few public outreach officials. Guehenno said he hoped the UN advisers would be able to help rationalize AMIS' logistics structures and put in place the groundwork for the eventual UN deployment.

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Darfur Needs Quality  
Troops, Equipment  
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17. (C) Guehenno confided that while he preferred non-NATO troop contributors for the Darfur mission for political reasons, the most likely contributors from Muslim countries -) Jordan, Egypt, and Indonesia -) had proven "uneven in past peacekeeping missions." Guehenno added that all troops serving in the UN force would need quality equipment and air support to operate effectively in Darfur.

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Development, Regional Inequities  
Key to Resolving Darfur Conflict  
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18. (C) Natsios explained that, in addition to pushing the Sudanese to accept a UN deployment in Darfur, he planned to look for ways to address the underlying development problems and regional inequities that fuel the Darfur conflict. Guehenno welcomed this approach, pointing out that the failure of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) to tackle the lack of development had contributed to a further deterioration of the security situation. Likewise, the Darfur refugees will want compensation and development assistance if they are ever to accept the DPA.

19. (U) Special Envoy Andrew Natsios' staff cleared this message.

BOLTON